IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpfi/0304004.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ownership Structure and Corporate Firm Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Jayesh Kumar

    (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

Abstract

Corporate Governance deals with the issue, how suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Several Studies have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Using different samples most of the studies provide general support for the argument that increase in managerial ownership increases firm performance. However, these results have been questioned recently. This work examines empirically the effects of ownership structure on the firm performance for a large sample of Indian Corporate Firms, from an 'agency perspective'. We examine the literature on this topic by examining the effect of interactions between corporate, foreign, financial, institutional, and managerial ownership. We provide empirical evidence, which suggests that firm size and age is nonlinearly related to the firm performance. Using panel data framework, we show that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation, in performance, found in several studies, is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity, rather than the share holders holding. We do not find any evidence that the differences in Ownership structure, affect firm performance; after controlling for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Jayesh Kumar, 2003. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Firm Performance," Finance 0304004, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0304004
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Linux pdflatex; to print on HP/PostScript/; pages: 42 ; figures: included. I would like to thank Dr. Kausik CHodhuri for his suggestion and help.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/fin/papers/0304/0304004.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Helen Short & Kevin Keasey & Darren Duxbury, 2002. "Capital Structure, Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 375-399.
    2. Chhibber, Pradeep & Majumdar, Sumit K, 1998. "State as Investor and State as Owner: Consequences for Firm Performance in India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(3), pages 561-580, April.
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    7. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2000. "Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 1(3), pages 161-194.
    8. Nandini Gupta, 2005. "Partial Privatization and Firm Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 987-1015, April.
    9. Jensen, Michael C. & Warner, Jerold B., 1988. "The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 3-24, January.
    10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    11. Stigler, George J & Friedland, Claire, 1983. "The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 237-268, June.
    12. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    13. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    14. Gautam Ahuja & Sumit Majumdar, 1998. "An Assessment of the Performance of Indian State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 113-132, March.
    15. Das, Sanghamitra, 1995. "Size, age and firm growth in an infant industry: The computer hardware industry in India," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-126, March.
    16. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    17. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter.
    18. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
    19. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    20. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
    21. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    22. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    23. Barbosa, Natalia & Louri, Helen, 2002. "On the determinants of multinationals' ownership preferences: evidence from Greece and Portugal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 493-515, April.
    24. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, "undated". "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Pieri & Enrico Zaninotto, 2010. "The Impact of Vertical Integration and Outsourcing on Firm Efficiency: Evidence from the Italian Machine Tool Industry," DISA Working Papers 1001, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 11 Mar 2010.
    2. Anselm Komla Abots, 2015. "Foreign Ownership of Firms and Corruption in Africa," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 5(3), pages 647-655.
    3. Anjali Kumar & Manuela Francisco, 2005. "Enterprise Size, Financing Patterns, and Credit Constraints in Brazil : Analysis of Data from the Investment Climate Assessment Survey," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7330.
    4. Oleg Badunenko, 2010. "Downsizing in the German chemical manufacturing industry during the 1990s. Why is small beautiful?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 413-431, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; share holding pattern and firm performance;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0304004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.