If only I could sack you! Management turnover and performance in large German Banks between 1874 and 1913
We analyze the relation of firm performance and managerial turnover in 19th century German banking by probit estimation. This period covers a major reform of corporate governance. Before the reform performance and turnover are unrelated, wheras after the reform more succesfull managers leave firms more seldom. However, only short run performance matters.
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