When Do Punishment Institutions Work?
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Casari, Marco & Cason, Timothy N., 2009. "The strategy method lowers measured trustworthy behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 157-159, June.
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More about this item
Keywordspunishment; cooperation; gift exchange; reciprocity;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- J49 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Other
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-08-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2015-08-01 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DEM-2015-08-01 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2015-08-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2015-08-01 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2015-08-01 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2015-08-01 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
- NEP-PBE-2015-08-01 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2015-08-01 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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