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Is a guaranteed living wage a good anti-poverty policy?

Author

Listed:
  • Murgai, Rinku
  • Ravallion, Martin

Abstract

Minimum wages are generally thought to be unenforceable in developing rural economies. But there is one solution - a workfare scheme in which the government acts as the employer of last resort. Is this a cost-effective policy against poverty? Using a microeconometric model of the casual labor market in rural India, the authors find that a guaranteed wage rate sufficient for a typical poor family to reach the poverty line would bring the annual poverty rate down from 34 percent to 25 percent at a fiscal cost representing 3-4 percent of GDP when run for the whole year. Confining the scheme to the lean season (three months) would bring the annual poverty rate down to 31 percent at a cost of 1.3 percent of GDP. While the gains from a guaranteed wage rate would be better targeted than a uniform (untargeted) cash transfer, the extra costs of the wage policy imply that it would have less impact on poverty.

Suggested Citation

  • Murgai, Rinku & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Is a guaranteed living wage a good anti-poverty policy?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3640, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3640
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Datt, Gaurav & Ravallion, Martin, 1994. "Transfer Benefits from Public-Works Employment: Evidence for Rural India," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1346-1369, November.
    2. Martin Ravallion & Gaurav Datt, 1995. "Is Targeting Through a Work Requirement Efficient? Some Evidence for Rural India," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-41, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Foster, James & Greer, Joel & Thorbecke, Erik, 1984. "A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(3), pages 761-766, May.
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    5. Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 2003. "Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 21(1), pages 19-30, January.
    6. Besley, T., 1988. "Workfare Vs. Welfare: Incentive Arguments For Work Requirements In Poverty Alleviation Programs," Papers 142, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    7. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2005. "Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South India," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 648-657, 04/05.
    8. Coady, David P. & Grosh, Margaret & Hoddinott, John, 2002. "Targeting outcomes redux," FCND briefs 144, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    9. Martin Ravallion & Emanuela Galasso & Teodoro Lazo & Ernesto Philipp, 2005. "What Can Ex-Participants Reveal about a Program’s Impact?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(1).
    10. Harris, John R & Todaro, Michael P, 1970. "Migration, Unemployment & Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 126-142, March.
    11. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
    12. Lipton, Michael & Ravallion, Martin, 1995. "Poverty and policy," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 2551-2657, Elsevier.
    13. David Coady, 2004. "Targeting Outcomes Redux," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 19(1), pages 61-85.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karthik Muralidharan & Paul Niehaus & Sandip Sukhtankar, 2023. "General Equilibrium Effects of (Improving) Public Employment Programs: Experimental Evidence From India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1261-1295, July.
    2. Padmini Desikachar & Brinda Viswanathan, 2011. "Patterns of Labour Market Insecurity in Rural India: A Multidimensional and Multivariate Analysis," Working Papers 2011-062, Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India.
    3. repec:ilo:ilowps:462988 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Charles Meth, 2011. "Employer of Last Resort? South Africa’s Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP)," SALDRU Working Papers 58, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
    5. Padmini Desikachar & Brinda Viswanathan, 2012. "Patterns of Labour Market Insecurity in Rural India: A Multidimensional and Multivariate Analysis," Working Papers id:4901, eSocialSciences.
    6. Benassi, Chiara., 2011. "The implementation of minimum wage : challenges and creative solutions," ILO Working Papers 994629883402676, International Labour Organization.
    7. repec:aia:aiaswp:wp116 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Gentilini, Ugo & Omamo, Steven Were, 2011. "Social protection 2.0: Exploring issues, evidence and debates in a globalizing world," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 329-340, June.
    9. Sunanda Roy, 2007. "Self insurance and public employment programs," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(31), pages 1-15.
    10. Margaret Grosh & Carlo del Ninno & Emil Tesliuc & Azedine Ouerghi, 2008. "For Protection and Promotion : The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6582, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics&Policies; Safety Nets and Transfers; Rural Poverty Reduction; Services&Transfers to Poor; Health Economics&Finance;
    All these keywords.

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