Stock market and investment : the governance role of the market
Institutional investors have become tremendously important in U.S. capital markets in recent years. But a study of 557 U.S. manufacturing firms (1985-90) shows the role of such investors to be mixed. Results show the following: 1) institutional ownership has a positive effect on capital spending but apparently a negative effect on research and development spending and no effect on advertising expenditures. So, institutional ownership might contribute to a firm's underinvestment in intangible assets and hence exacerbate managerial myopia; 2) institutional investors are complex institutions, so the regulatory and investment environment in which they operate must be carefully designed. The institutionalization of the stock market happened gradually in the U.S. and some other industrial countries and may happen gradually in developing countries as their financial markets are reformed and deepened; 3) there is a fundamental conflict between liquidity and control as objectives on institutional investment. In the U.S., liquidity has been the dominant objective and"exit"rather than"voice"has been the preferred option of institutional investors on corporate governance issues. But recently"voice"has begun to be a more important objective; 4) institutional investors'monitoring and disciplinary activities may (through corporate governance) substitute for the disciplinary and signaling roles of debt. But there is no definite evidence that institutional ownership by itself improves firm performance. Still, activism by institutional investors has replaced takeovers as the central mechanism of corporate government in the U.S. in the 1990s. The implication for developing countries: encourage institutional ownership of equity, and promote activism among institutional investors. The U.S. experience cannot always be generalized to other countries, but it does demonstrate that such activism can be a viable alternative to takeovers as a vehicle for corporate governance. It is also important for curbing the excesses of managerial discretion and maximizing shareholder values.
|Date of creation:||31 Mar 1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
- Roe, Mark J., 1990. "Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 7-41, September.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
- Vittas, Dimitri & Michelitsch, Roland, 1995. "Pension funds in Central Europe and Russia : their prospects and potential role in corporate governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1459, The World Bank.
- Mark J. Roe, 1997. "The Political Roots Of American Corporate Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(4), pages 8-22.
- Vittas, Dimitri & Iglesias, Augusto, 1992. "The rationale and performance of personal pension plans in Chile," Policy Research Working Paper Series 867, The World Bank.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
- Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Stock Market and Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(2), pages 157-216.
- Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 1986.
"Profits in the Long Run,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521306935.
- Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Grundfest, Joseph A., 1990. "Subordination of American capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-114, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1578. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.