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A Beautiful Blonde: a Nash coordination game

Author

Listed:
  • Simon P. Anderson
  • Maxim Engers

Abstract

In a memorable scene from the …lm ”A Beautiful Mind,” John Nash explains to his friends how to direct their attentions to women in a bar. Game theorists who have seen the …lm point out that the proposed solution is not a Nash equilibrium. Here we determine the Nash equilibria to the attention game. The symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium has resembles a common property resource problem. It has perverse comparative static properties that are not borne out by experimental data. Finally, we discuss alternative ways of formulating the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon P. Anderson & Maxim Engers, 2002. "A Beautiful Blonde: a Nash coordination game," Virginia Economics Online Papers 359, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:359
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    File URL: http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap359.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Toolsema, Linda A., 2003. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," CCSO Working Papers 200304, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
    2. William E. Becker, 2007. "Quit Lying and Address the Controversies: There are No Dogmata, Laws, Rules or Standards in the Science of Economics," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 51(1), pages 3-14, March.
    3. repec:dgr:rugsom:03f16 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Toolsema, Linda A., 2003. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," Research Report 03F16, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    5. Becker, William E., 2004. "Good-byE old, hello new in teaching economics," Australasian Journal of Economics Education (AJEE), University of Queensland, School of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 5-17, March.
    6. repec:dgr:rugccs:200304 is not listed on IDEAS

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