Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Haan, Marco A. & Riyanto, Yohanes, 2006.
"The effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 45-68, January.
- Haan, Marco & Riyanto, Yohanes, 1999. "The effects of takeover threats of shareholders and firm value," CCSO Working Papers 199912, University of Groningen, CCSO Centre for Economic Research.
- Haan, Marco & Riyanto, Yohanes, 2000. "The effects of takeover threats of shareholders and firm value," Research Report 00E02, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elberfeld, Walter & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999.
"A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 513-525, May.
- Elmar Wolfstetter & Walter Elberfeld, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Bertrand Competition with Entry," Microeconomics 9701003, EconWPA.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
- Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2001. "A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Relationship Between Group Size and Helping," Economics Working Paper Archive 417, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, June.
- Simon P. Anderson & Maxim Engers, 2002. "A Beautiful Blonde: a Nash coordination game," Virginia Economics Online Papers 359, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gro:rugsom:03f16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hanneke Tamling). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ferugnl.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.