A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires
In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza S.Francesco,7 - 53100 Siena|
Web page: http://www.deps.unisi.it/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995.
"Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
- Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Storcken, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences," Other publications TiSEM 0789742b-ab29-48ba-89d9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Demange, Gabrielle, 1987.
Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-1074, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:437. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.