A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires
In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.
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- Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
- Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Storcken, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences," Other publications TiSEM 0789742b-ab29-48ba-89d9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-74, September.
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