A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires
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References listed on IDEAS
- Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995.
"Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
- Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Storcken, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences," Other publications TiSEM 0789742b-ab29-48ba-89d9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-1074, September.
More about this item
- O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
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