A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires
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Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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- Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Storcken, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1995. "Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences," Other publications TiSEM 0789742b-ab29-48ba-89d9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
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