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Industry-specificities and Size of Corporations: Determinants of Ownership Structures

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  • C. van der Elst

Abstract

This paper analyses ownership concentration in six European countries and empirically studies the rent-seeking theory. This theory states that ownership concentration not only depends on the level of investor protection but also on company-specific and industry-specific parameters. This study analyses the sector specific ownership patterns of listed corporations. The results only partially confirm the influence of industry-specific characteristics. Different industries are characterised by different shareholder concentration patterns. Hence and in light of the rent-seeking theory it is plausible that company’s specific characteristics, like the identity of the largest shareholder, the risk of the firm, etc. influence rent-seeking behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • C. van der Elst, 2004. "Industry-specificities and Size of Corporations: Determinants of Ownership Structures," Working Papers 04-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0419
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    File URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/7390/04-19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 265, OECD Publishing.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    4. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    5. Franks, Julian R & Mayer, Colin & Rossi, Stefano, 2003. "The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 3822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, 2003. "Why Are the Levels of Control (So) Different in German and U.K. Companies? Evidence from Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 141-175, April.
    7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    10. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    Cited by:

    1. Helen Callaghan, 2015. "Something left to lose? Network preservation as a motive for protectionist responses to foreign takeovers," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 391-418, April.
    2. Rahman, Asheq & Yammeesri, Jira & Perera, Hector, 2010. "Financial reporting quality in international settings: A comparative study of the USA, Japan, Thailand, France and Germany," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-34, March.
    3. Christian Weiss & Stefan Hilger, 2012. "Ownership concentration beyond good and evil: is there an effect on corporate performance?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(4), pages 727-752, November.
    4. Callaghan, Helen, 2012. "Economic nationalism, network-based coordination, and the market for corporate control: Motives for political resistance to foreign takeovers," MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/10, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

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    Keywords

    Voting-block statistics; industry characteristics; size; determinants of ownership concentration;

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