Health-Risking Informal Service: Price, Prevalence and Law Enforcement
The health-risking informal service is transacted when the expected extra satisfaction rate exceeds the ratio of the expected extra cost to the formal service price. Its prevalence decreases with the costs of risk bearing for the providers and clients. Law-enforcement effort lowers (raises) the informal service equilibrium price when the ratio of the providers' and the clients' degrees of absolute risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the ratio of the law-enforcement elasticities of their cost bearing. Spending on law enforcement is efficient when the public cost of the expected chain-infection stemming from the informal service exceeds a threshold level.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
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"A lifetime portfolio of risky and risk-free sexual behaviour and the prevalence of AIDS,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 993-1007, November.
- Levy, A., 2000. "A Lifetime Portfolio of Risky and Risk-Free Sexual Behaviour and the Prevalence of AIDS," Economics Working Papers wp01-04, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
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