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Ties that Bind: the Kin System as a Mechanism of Income-Hiding Between Spouses in Rural Ghana

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  • Carolina Castilla

Abstract

I present a model of intra-household allocation to show that when income is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation increases bargaining power. I draw data from Ghana and exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband's own reporting of farm sales and the wife's reporting of his farm sales, to test whether the allocation of resources is consistent with hiding.

Suggested Citation

  • Carolina Castilla, 2013. "Ties that Bind: the Kin System as a Mechanism of Income-Hiding Between Spouses in Rural Ghana," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2013-007, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2013-007
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoel, Jessica B., 2015. "Heterogeneous households: A within-subject test of asymmetric information between spouses in Kenya," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 123-135.
    2. Friedson-Ridenour, Sophia & Pierotti, Rachael S., 2019. "Competing priorities: Women’s microenterprises and household relationships," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 53-62.
    3. Serena Masino & Miguel Niño-Zarazúa, 2014. "Social Service Delivery and Access to Financial Innovation: The Impact of Oportunidades' Electronic Payment System in Mexico," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2014-034, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Masino, Serena & Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel, 2014. "Social service delivery and access to financial innovation. The impact of Oportunidades’ electronic payment system in Mexico," MPRA Paper 53430, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Castilla, Carolina & Walker, Thomas F., 2012. "Gender Roles and Intra-Household Allocation: Identifying Differences in the Incentives to Hide Money Across Spouses in Ghana," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124923, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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