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Ties that bind: The kin system as a mechanism of income-hiding between spouses in rural Ghana

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  • Castilla, Carolina

Abstract

I present a model of intra-household allocation to show that when income is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation increases bargaining power. I draw data from Ghana and exploit the variation in the degree

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File URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/wp2013/WP2013-007.pdf
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number UNU-WIDER Research Paper WP2013/007.

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Length: 32
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2013-007
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Keywords: incomplete information; income-hiding; non-cooperative family bargaining;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
  • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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  1. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  2. Junsen Zhang & William Chan, 1999. "Dowry and Wife's Welfare: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 786-808, August.
  3. Nava Ashraf, 2009. "Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1245-77, September.
  4. Esther Duflo, 2001. "Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 795-813, September.
  5. Martin Browning & P.A. Chiappori, 1996. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations - A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 96-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Ligon, Ethan, 2002. "Dynamic bargaining in households (with an application to Bangladesh)," CUDARE Working Paper Series 972, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
  7. Hoff, Karla & Sen, Arijit, 2005. "The kin system as a poverty trap?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3575, The World Bank.
  8. Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1990. "Population Growth and Human Capital Investments: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S38-70, October.
  9. Chen, Joyce J., 2013. "Identifying non-cooperative behavior among spouses: Child outcomes in migrant-sending households," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 1-18.
  10. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-46, October.
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Cited by:

  1. Castilla, Carolina & Walker, Thomas F., 2012. "Gender Roles and Intra-Household Allocation: Identifying Differences in the Incentives to Hide Money Across Spouses in Ghana," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124923, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  2. Masino, Serena & Nino-Zarazua, Miguel, 2014. "Social service delivery and access to financial innovation: The impact of Oportunidades. electronic payment system in Mexico," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  3. Chen, Joyce J. & Collins, LaPorchia, 2013. "Let’s Talk About the Money: Spousal Communication, Expenditures and Farm Production," 2014 Allied Social Science Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting, January 3-5, 2014, Philadelphia, PA 161652, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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