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Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons

Author

Listed:
  • Méder, Z.Z.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

  • Flesch, J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Peeters, R.J.A.P.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Méder, Z.Z. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2012. "Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012024
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012024
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. W. A. Brock & A. Haurie, 1976. "On Existence of Overtaking Optimal Trajectories Over an Infinite Time Horizon," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 1(4), pages 337-346, November.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Brock, William A, 1970. "An Axiomatic Basis for the Ramsey- Weizsacker Overtaking Criterion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 927-929, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski & Eilon Solan, 2020. "Reachability and Safety Objectives in Markov Decision Processes on Long but Finite Horizons," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 185(3), pages 945-965, June.
    2. János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski & Eilon Solan, 2017. "Sporadic Overtaking Optimality in Markov Decision Problems," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 212-228, June.

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