Multibidding Game under Uncertainty
This paper considers situations in which a set of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I propose the use of the individually-rational and budget-balanced multibidding mechanism according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules as defined by PÃ©rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) under complete information. It can be applied in a wide range of situations, and its symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria deliver ex post efficient outcomes if the number of players is two - for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty - or very large.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2004|
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