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Multibidding Game under Uncertainty

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  • Róbert F. Veszteg

    (School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra)

Abstract

This paper considers situations in which a set of agents has to decide whether to carry out a given public project or its alternative when agents hold private information. I propose the use of the individually-rational and budget-balanced multibidding mechanism according to which the game to be played by participants has only one stage and simple rules as defined by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) under complete information. It can be applied in a wide range of situations, and its symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria deliver ex post efficient outcomes if the number of players is two - for any underlying symmetric distribution characterizing uncertainty - or very large.

Suggested Citation

  • Róbert F. Veszteg, 2004. "Multibidding Game under Uncertainty," Faculty Working Papers 14/04, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    • Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp1404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-299, May.
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    10. David Pérez-Castrillo & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," Working Papers 155, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pintér, Ágnes & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2010. "Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 36-50, March.
    2. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2011. "Choosing and sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 296-300, September.
    3. Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas, 2012. "Smooth multibidding mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 420-438.
    4. Lars Ehlers, 2009. "Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 505-512, June.
    5. David Perez-Castrillo & Robert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 638.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Perez-Castrillo, David & Veszteg, Robert F., 2007. "Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 394-411, July.
    7. Reyes Calderon Cuadrado, 2005. "Corruption: A Corporate Perspective," Faculty Working Papers 10/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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