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Corruption: A Corporate Perspective

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  • Reyes Calderon Cuadrado

    () (School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra)

Abstract

This paper offers a framework within which the corporate corruption may be analyzed and a comprehensive road map to understand the role played by corporation on corruption. Despite corruption is a field with a long tradition and a common topic of many researches, disagreements persist about definitions, causes, consequences and policies. Divergences are specially wide in relations with the role played by corporations. This article realizes a literature review about relationship between corporation and corruption, showing causes of discrepancies and it explains and justifies the differences adding to classical explicative elements legality and efficiency, the alignment and the principal-agent problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Reyes Calderon Cuadrado, 2005. "Corruption: A Corporate Perspective," Faculty Working Papers 10/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
  • Handle: RePEc:una:unccee:wp1005
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    File URL: http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1132669277_wp1105.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Róbert Veszteg, 2010. "Multibidding game under uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
    2. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May.
    3. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pintér, Ágnes & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2010. "Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 36-50, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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