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Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism

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  • David Pérez-Castrillo
  • Róbert F. Veszteg

Abstract

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • David Pérez-Castrillo & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2005. "Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism," Working Papers 155, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:155
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
    2. Binmore, Ken & McCarthy, John & Ponti, Giovanni & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 2002. "A Backward Induction Experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 48-88, May.
    3. William Harbaugh & Kate Krause & Lise Vesterlund, 2002. "Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and Losses," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 53-84, June.
    4. Róbert Veszteg, 2010. "Multibidding game under uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
    5. Pavlo Blavatsky, 2003. "Note on "Small Feedback-based Decisions and Their Limited Correspondence to Description-based Decisions"," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp218, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    6. repec:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:198-215 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Josef Falkinger, 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March.
    8. Coppinger, Vicki M & Smith, Vernon L & Titus, Jon A, 1980. "Incentives and Behavior in English, Dutch and Sealed-Bid Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, January.
    9. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
    10. Smith, Vernon L, 1980. "Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 584-599, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Róbert Veszteg, 2010. "Multibidding game under uncertainty," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
    2. Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas, 2012. "Smooth multibidding mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 420-438.
    3. Perez-Castrillo, David & Veszteg, Robert F., 2007. "Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 394-411, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; mechanisms; uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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