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On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

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Abstract

This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

Suggested Citation

  • X. Henry Wang & Judy Hsu, 2004. "On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation," Working Papers 0416, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 23 Dec 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0416
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    File URL: https://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2004/wp0416_wang.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gallini, Nancy T, 1984. "Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for Licensing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 931-941, December.
    2. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    3. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
    4. Lin, Ping, 1996. "Fixed-Fee Licensing of Innovations and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 443-449, December.
    5. Mukesh Eswaran, 1994. "Licensees as Entry Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 673-688, August.
    6. Ana I. Saracho, 2002. "Patent Licensing Under Strategic Delegation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 225-251, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    licensing; strategic delegation;

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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