Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy
We reconsider the justifications of the R&D subsidies of Spencer and Brander (1983), by allowing firms to form a research joint venture (RJV) and license innovations. If governments offer unconditional subsidies, an RJV is formed and the strategic benefits of R&D subsidies vanish. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms to enhance their bargaining position in the joint venture subgame. If governments offer subsidies conditional on forming resp. not forming an RJV, the game has multiple equilibria: one that restores the Spencer and Brander result, and another in which governments induce the formation of an RJV by a combination of conditional taxes and subsidies.
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Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 1-19
| Handle: | RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:20 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: https://www.degruyter.com
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| Order Information: | Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte |
References listed on IDEAS
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- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008.
"License auctions with royalty contracts for (winners and) losers,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 91-106, May.
- Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 199, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 2002. "Uncertainty, spillovers, and cooperative R&D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 855-876, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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