Cost pass-through under delegation
The rate of cost pass-through exceeds 50% under strategic delegation of decision-making to managers with sales revenue contracts - regardless of the number of firms in the industry and demand curvature.� This contrasts sharply with profit-maximization, for which cost pass-through can take on any positive value.� The key intuition is that firms under delegation act as if they faced more rivals than they actually do, thus pushing cost pass-through towards 100%.� Cost pass-through with market share contracts is similarly bounded below, and this note also generalizes existing results on equilibrium characterization for this case.
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