Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources
The Tragedy of the Commons refers to the dissipation of a common- pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the behavior of absolute payoff maximisation, the common-pool resource game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is overexploited. However, some empirical studies show that the overutilization is even larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||2008|
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- Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
- Ito, Masaru & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Une, Masashi, 1995.
"The Tragedy of the Commons revisited Identifying behavioral principles,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 311-335, December.
- Ito, M. & Saijo, T. & Une, M., 1994. "The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited: Identifying Behavioral Principles," ISER Discussion Paper 0338, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007.
"Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January.
- Joëlle Noailly & Cees A. Withagen & Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, 2005. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Working Papers 2005.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Noailly, J. & Withagen, C.A.A.M. & van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., 2007. "Spatial evolution of social norms in a common-pool resource game," Other publications TiSEM bfad28c3-a42a-4f2a-b867-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2003.
"Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
03_01, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
- Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2006. "Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(3), pages 713-719, November.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
- Pingle, Mark & Day, Richard H., 1996. "Modes of economizing behavior: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 191-209, March.
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