IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ude/wpaper/0115.html

Recursos comunes, conflictos y turismo

Author

Listed:
  • Elvio Accinelli

    (Facultad de Economía de la UASLP y Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

  • Edgar Sánchez Carrera

    (Facultad de Economía de la UASLP)

Abstract

En este trabajo se considera la llegada de inversores extranjeros a una playa, hasta hora utilizada sólo por residentes locales. La posibilidad de beneficios positivos ante una demanda creciente por servicios hoteleros en el lugar, puede generar conflictos entre la población local y las firmas extranjeras entrantes. Ante esta situación una autoridad administrativa local puede tomar medidas para enlentecer o evitar el surgimiento del mismo. La playa, es considerada como un recurso común, que no puede ser enajenado aunque sí, entregada en concesión para su explotación privada, por la autoridad local.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Edgar Sánchez Carrera, 2015. "Recursos comunes, conflictos y turismo," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0115, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0115
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4526
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    3. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.
    4. Bieta, Volker & Broll, Udo & Siebe, Wilfried, 2014. "Collateral in banking policy: On the possibility of signaling," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 137-141.
    5. Salvatore Piccolo & Piero Tedeschi & Giovanni Ursino, 2018. "Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 1291-1310, March.
    6. Horaguchi, Haruo, 1996. "The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 287-294, June.
    7. Bose, Subir, 2014. "Monopolistic screening and uninformed buyers," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 348-353.
    8. Jenny Simon, 2014. "Imperfect Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 4902, CESifo.
    9. Fadel, Ronald & Segal, Ilya, 2009. "The communication cost of selfishness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1895-1920, September.
    10. Kranich, Laurence, 1997. "Equalizing opportunities through public education when innate abilities are unobservable," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7216, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. Van Kolpin & Mark Stater, 2013. "The Real Deal? Information Asymmetries and Tuition Discounting in Higher Education," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 5(2), pages 190-212, December.
    12. Kimmo Berg, 2013. "Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 206(1), pages 23-37, July.
    13. Richard Chisik, 2015. "Job market signalling, stereotype threat and counter‐stereotypical behaviour," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 155-188, February.
    14. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
    15. Menicucci, Domenico, 2006. "Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 280-300, May.
    16. Katerina Sherstyuk & Nori Tarui & Majah-Leah Ravago & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2011. "Payment schemes in random-termination experimental games," Working Papers 201102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    17. Gömöri, András, 2005. "Nyugdíjrendszer és játékelmélet. Megjegyzések Mészáros József cikkéhez [The pension system and game theory. Remarks on the article by József Mészáros]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 732-742.
    18. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil’s approach to a strategic context," Macroeconomics 0504035, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Apr 2005.
    19. Zaki Wahhaj, 2012. "Social Norms, Higher-Order Beliefs and the Emperor's New Clothes," Studies in Economics 1210, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    20. Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Doneschi or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/derauuy.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.