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Protección de la competencia en Chile: El Estado vs Laboratorios Chile y Recalcine (1992/93)

Author

Listed:
  • Edgardo Barandiarán
  • Ricardo Paredes

Abstract

Este trabajo analiza la denuncia contra Laboratorios Chile y Recalcine por concertación de precios de sus productos farmacéuticos genéricos. Al momento de la denuncia (1992) los dos laboratorios representaban el 82 por ciento del total de las ventas de esos productos en los mercados nacionales. El artículo analiza el proceso y las pruebas del caso para explicar las decisiones opuestas de la Comisión Preventiva y de la Comisión Resolutiva y evaluar si el sistema contribuye a la seguridad jurídica requerida para la libre competencia. En este caso, el proceso fracasó en generar pruebas adecuadas para una decisión fundamentada y las comisiones apreciaron las pocas pruebas con criterios distintos. En consecuencia, sus decisiones no contribuyeron a promover esa seguridad jurídica. No obstante, el análisis del caso es de utilidad para entender el funcionamiento del sistema de protección de la competencia.

Suggested Citation

  • Edgardo Barandiarán & Ricardo Paredes, 2002. "Protección de la competencia en Chile: El Estado vs Laboratorios Chile y Recalcine (1992/93)," Working Papers wp191, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp191
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2006. "Preponderance of evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 963-976, May.
    2. F. M. Scherer, 1993. "Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 97-115, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; collusion.;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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