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Protección de la Competencia en Chile: El Estado y Laboratorios Chile y Recalcine (1992-93)

Author

Listed:
  • Edgardo Barandiarán
  • Ricardo Paredes

Abstract

In 1992, Laboratorios Chile and Recalcine, the two largest pharmaceutical companies in Chile with a share of 82% of the domestic markets for generic products, were accused of collusion. The paper analyzes the process and the evidence considered by the Antitrust Commissions to assess the extent to which the Chilean system has been able to provide seguridad jurídica for market competition. Albeit economic models were readily available to argue the case, the process failed to generate the evidence necessary to apply them properly. The opposite decisions of the two Commissions reflected this failure and differences in the standards of proof. The analysis is useful, however, to understand the behavior and performance of the Chilean system of competition law.

Suggested Citation

  • Edgardo Barandiarán & Ricardo Paredes, 2002. "Protección de la Competencia en Chile: El Estado y Laboratorios Chile y Recalcine (1992-93)," Documentos de Trabajo 222, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:222
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    File URL: https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt-222.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2006. "Preponderance of evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 963-976, May.
    2. F. M. Scherer, 1993. "Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 97-115, Summer.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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