Should the death tax die? And should it leave an inheritance?
In this paper we examine the possibility of earmarking inheritance taxes to the financing of a transfer to the poor, aimed at reducing the payoff from small crime and at fostering the fulfillment of basic social responsibilities. A simple model of a society in which there are two types of agents either supplying legal labor or participating in criminal activity is presented. The effects of the transfer are examined with reference to two policy designs and to attitudes toward risk\ of the agents. Financing the transfer through inheritance taxation may be advisable as a way of collecting the needed revenue from agents who are likely to maintain strong enough incentives to good.
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- Wane, Waly, 2001.
"The optimal income tax when poverty is a public 'bad',"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 271-299, November.
- Wane, Waly, 2000. "The optimal income tax when poverty is a public"bad"," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2270, The World Bank.
- Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 2000. "On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Ayse Imrohoroglu & Antonio Merlo & Peter Rupert, 1996. "On the political economy of income redistribution and crime," Working Paper 9609, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Imrohoroglu, Ayse & Merlo, Antonio & Rupert, Peter, 1996. "On the political economy of income redistribution and crime," Bulletins 7497, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Ayse Imrohoroglu & Antonio Merlo & Peter Rupert, 1996. "On the political economy of income redistribution and crime," Staff Report 216, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Louis Kaplow, 2000. "A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation," NBER Working Papers 7775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1971. "Optimal Mechanisms for Income Transfer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 324-334, June.
- Demougin, Dominique & Schwager, Robert, 2000. "Excess burden of criminality and redistribution," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 329-351, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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