Competitive Market Segmentation
In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
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- Stole, Lars A, 1995. "Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 529-562, Winter.
- Robert B. Barsky & Mark Bergen & Shantanu Dutta & Daniel Levy, 2003.
"What Can the Price Gap between Branded and Private-Label Products Tell Us about Markups?,"
NBER Chapters,in: Scanner Data and Price Indexes, pages 165-228
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Barsky & Mark Bergen & Shantanu Dutta & Daniel Levy, 2001. "What Can the Price Gap between Branded and Private Label Products Tell Us about Markups?," NBER Working Papers 8426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Barsky & Mark Bergen & Shantanu Dutta & Daniel Levy, 2002. "What Can the Price Gap between Branded and Private Label Products Tell Us about Markups?," Working Papers 2002-02, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2001. "Competitive Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 579-605, Winter.
- Verboven, Frank, 1999. "Product Line Rivalry and Market Segmentation--With an Application to Automobile Optional Engine Pricing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 399-425, December.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Lars A. Stole, 2002. "Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 277-311.
- George Deltas & Thanasis Stengos & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2011. "Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 907-929, August.
- George Deltas & Thanasis Stengos & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2010. "Product Line Pricing in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly," Working Paper Series 14_10, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- George Deltas & Thanasis Stengos & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2010. "Product Line Pricing in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly," Working Papers 1010, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Barron, John M & Taylor, Beck A & Umbeck, John R, 2000. "A Theory of Quality-Related Differences in Retail Margins: Why There Is a "Premium" on Premium Gasoline," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 550-569, October.
- Bonatti, Alessandro, 2011. "Brand-specific tastes for quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 562-575, September.
- André Bonfrer & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, 2004. "Store Brands: Who Buys Them and What Happens to Retail Prices When They Are Introduced?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 24(2), pages 195-218, 03. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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