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Endogenous Coalitions Formations Through Technology Transfers and Fair Prices

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrice Valognes

    (Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS UMR 6211)

  • Hélène Ferrer

    (Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS UMR 6211)

  • Guillermo Owen

    (Dept. of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA.)

Abstract

We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Drèze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these ``licensing coalitions.''

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Valognes & Hélène Ferrer & Guillermo Owen, 2011. "Endogenous Coalitions Formations Through Technology Transfers and Fair Prices," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201109, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201109
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    File URL: https://crem-doc.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2011/201109.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Game Theory; Technology Transfers; Modified Shapley Value;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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