IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tut/cccrwp/2012-10-ccr.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Buchanan on Freedom

Author

Listed:
  • Geoffrey Brennan

    (Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Australia - Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA - University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, USA)

  • Michael Brooks

    (School of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania, Australia)

Abstract

Our object is to explicate Buchanan's conception of individual liberty and to trace its connection to the 'working themes' in his corpus-anarchy, contract, constitution, Pareto optimality, 'public choice' and so on. In doing so, we investigate a number of tensions in Buchanan's conception-between a libertarian affinity with anarchy and constitutional contractarianism; and that between procedural liberalism and classical liberalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffrey Brennan & Michael Brooks, 2012. "Buchanan on Freedom," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-10-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2012-10-ccr
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversions/237d2de8-c4d4-4e5d-b32e-326134ca4c23
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dowding, Keith, 1992. "Choice: Its Increase and its Value," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 301-314, July.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Edmund S. Phelps, 1973. "Taxation of Wage Income for Economic Justice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 331-354.
    5. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 1980. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521233293.
    6. Martin Van Hees & Marcel Wissenburg, 1999. "Freedom and Opportunity," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 47(1), pages 67-82, March.
    7. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios (ed.), 2012. "The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195392777.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
    2. Michael Brooks, 2015. "Analytic conservatism and analytic radicalism: Of understated distinctions and other analytical things," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 442-454, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Claudia Keser & David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette, 2020. "Labor Supply, Taxation, and the Use of Tax Revenues: A Real-Effort Experiment in Canada, France, and Germany," Public Finance Review, , vol. 48(6), pages 714-750, November.
    2. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
    3. Faggini, Marisa & Parziale, Anna, 2011. "Fitness landscape and tax planning: NK model for fiscal federalism," MPRA Paper 33770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Feld, Lars P. & Frey, Christian & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schmid, Lukas A., 2021. "Fiscal federalism and income inequality: An empirical analysis for Switzerland," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 463-494.
    5. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    6. Yu-Bong Lai, 2009. "Is a Double Dividend Better than a Single Dividend?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 342-363, June.
    7. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    8. Thomas Apolte, 2004. "Die eigentümliche Diskussion um Zentralisierung und Dezentralisierung in der Europapolitik," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(3), pages 271-291, August.
    9. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "Efficient Policy Choice in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," Penn CARESS Working Papers 325b228023bf2f04304dfd203, Penn Economics Department.
    10. Paul Pecorino, 2018. "Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: a synthesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 19-36, April.
    11. Haucap, Justus & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2011. "Economic principles of state aid control," DICE Discussion Papers 17, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    12. Shruti Rajagopalan & Richard Wagner, 2013. "Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 295-309, December.
    13. Wildasin, David E., 2004. "The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 57(2), pages 247-272, June.
    14. Russell S. Sobel, 1997. "Optimal Taxation in a Federal System of Governments," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 468-485, October.
    15. Eduardo Araral, 2014. "Policy and regulatory design for developing countries: a mechanism design and transaction cost approach," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 47(3), pages 289-303, September.
    16. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    17. Peter Coughlin, 1989. "Economic policy advice and political preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 201-216, June.
    18. James Gwartney & Randall Holcombe, 2014. "Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 265-279, September.
    19. Loeper, Antoine, 2017. "Cross-border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 180-208.
    20. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability and Government Support of Business Activity: Testing Theories of Social-Contract Failure," Working Papers w0028, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Freedom; Liberty; Anarchy; Constitutional Contractarianism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2012-10-ccr. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: GERMAIN Lucie (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cccrmfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.