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Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: a synthesis

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  • Paul Pecorino

    (University of Alabama)

Abstract

I develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending, where the Coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition. An increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending. A higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition, but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition. I develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of (i) a nonexcludable good, (ii) a distributive consumption good, (iii) infrastructure spending and (iv) a transfer payment. A supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending. An increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending. I also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1/n. If the Coase Theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms, an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement. Thus, the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1/n.

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  • Paul Pecorino, 2018. "Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: a synthesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 19-36, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0512-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0512-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank, Marco & Stadelmann, David, 2021. "More federal legislators lead to more resources for their constituencies: Evidence from exogenous differences in seat allocations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 230-243.
    2. George R. Crowley, 2019. "The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(2), pages 667-690, October.
    3. William B. Hankins, 2022. "Revisiting the effect of supermajority requirements on fiscal outcomes," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1625, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supermajority voting requirement; Law of 1/n; Government spending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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