The Pareto Principle of Optimal Inequality
The Pareto principle is often viewed as a mild requirement compatible with a variety of value judgements. In particular, it is generally thought that it can accommodate different degress of inequality aversion. We show that this is generally not true in time consistent intertemporal models where some uncertainty prevails.
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