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Cohabitation versus marriage: Marriage matching with peer effects

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  • Ismael Mourifie
  • Aloysius Siow

Abstract

This paper proposes an easy to estimate Cobb Douglas marriage matching function (MMF). Special cases include the Choo Siow (CS) MMF, CS with peer effects, CS with frictional transfers, the Dagsvik Menzel non-transferable utility MMF and Chiappori, Salanie and Weiss MMF. Given population supplies and admissible parameters, the Cobb Douglas MMF exists and is unique. This MMF is estimated on US marriage and cohabitation data by states from 1990 to 2010. CS with peer effects is not rejected. There are peer and scale e ects in the US marriage markets. Positive assortative matching in marriage and cohabitation by educational attainment are relatively stable from 1990 to 2010.

Suggested Citation

  • Ismael Mourifie & Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Cohabitation versus marriage: Marriage matching with peer effects," Working Papers tecipa-531, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-531
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, 2016. "Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment, and Married Female Labor-Force Participation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 1-41, January.
    2. Raquel Fernández & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2005. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 273-344.
    3. Dagsvik, John K, 2000. "Aggregation in Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 27-57, February.
    4. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, 2014. "Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 348-353, May.
    5. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 2001. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 235-260.
    6. Charles F. Manski, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 531-542.
    7. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    8. Adamopoulou, Effrosyni, 2012. "Peer Effects in Young Adults' Marital Decisions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1228, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brendan Pass, 2017. "Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing models," Papers 1701.04431, arXiv.org.
    2. Brendan Pass, 2019. "Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(2), pages 393-419, March.
    3. John K. Dagsvik & Zhiyang Jia, 2018. "Aggregate behavior in matching markets with flexible contracts and non-transferable representations of preferences," Discussion Papers 875, Statistics Norway, Research Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage matching; Peer effects; Cohabitation; equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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