IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/toh/dssraa/110.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Recurrent Preemption Games

Author

Listed:
  • Hitoshi Matsushima

Abstract

I consider a new model of an infinitely repeated preemption game with random matching, termed the recurrent preemption game, wherein each player's discount factor depends on whether she wins the current game. This model describes sequential strategic technology adoptions in which a company becomes outdated by failing to maintain a position at the forefront of innovation. Assuming incomplete information about the presence of a rival, I clarify how the prominence of the innovator's dilemma influences the degree of excessive competition in preemption. I also reveal interesting properties demonstrated by the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the recurrent preemption game.

Suggested Citation

  • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2020. "Recurrent Preemption Games," DSSR Discussion Papers 110, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
  • Handle: RePEc:toh:dssraa:110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10097/00127369
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hendricks, Kenneth, 1992. "Reputations in the adoption of a new technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 663-677, December.
    2. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2013. "Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 858-870.
    3. Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas, 2012. "Potential competition in preemption games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 53-66.
    4. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-526, June.
    5. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Prajit K. Dutta & Saul Lach & Aldo Rustichini, 1995. "Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 563-589, December.
    2. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Blocking in a timing game with asymmetric players," Working Papers 2018-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised May 2019.
    3. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Innovation in a generalized timing game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 23-33.
    4. Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2000. "Second-mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 315-338, February.
    5. Thomas, Louis A., 1999. "Adoption order of new technologies in evolving markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 453-482, April.
    6. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2021. "Preemption with a second-mover advantage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 294-309.
    7. Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 75-98, June.
    8. O'Shea, Lucy & Ulph, Alistair, 2008. "The role of pest resistance in biotechnology R&D investment strategy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 213-228, March.
    9. Fogel, Kathy & Jandik, Tomas & McCumber, William R., 2018. "CFO social capital and private debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 28-52.
    10. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    11. Liliana Meza-González & Jaime Marie Sepulveda, 2019. "The impact of competition with China in the US market on innovation in Mexican manufacturing firms," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 28(1), pages 1-21, December.
    12. Kenneth S. Corts, 2000. "Focused Firms and the Incentive to Innovate," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 339-362, June.
    13. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    14. Gabriele Camera & Cary Deck & David Porter, 2020. "Do economic inequalities affect long-run cooperation and prosperity?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 53-83, March.
    15. Xu, Xue & Potters, Jan, 2018. "An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 28-40.
    16. Erin L. Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 495-524, June.
    17. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8651 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Bertrand, Olivier & Zuniga, Pluvia, 2006. "R&D and M&A: Are cross-border M&A different? An investigation on OECD countries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 401-423, March.
    19. Steven Bond‐Smith, 2022. "Discretely innovating: The effect of limited market contestability on innovation and growth," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 301-327, July.
    20. Bramoullé, Yann & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2016. "Favoritism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 16-27.
    21. Ghidoni, Riccardo & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games," Other publications TiSEM ff3a441f-e196-4e45-ba59-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:toh:dssraa:110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tohoku University Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fetohjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.