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Dynamic incentives in the money management tournament

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  • Palomino, F.A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Prat, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 1998. "Dynamic incentives in the money management tournament," Discussion Paper 1998-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:33c9fd52-602a-4e31-a2a5-4b9fa798f6ad
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lakonishok, Josef & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1992. "The impact of institutional trading on stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 23-43, August.
    2. Huddart, Steven, 1999. "Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by investment advisers1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 227-271, August.
    3. Lettau, Martin, 1997. "Explaining the facts with adaptive agents: The case of mutual fund flows," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 1117-1147, June.
    4. Ippolito, Richard A, 1992. "Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 45-70, April.
    5. Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1997. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 547-581, June.
    6. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    7. Palomino, Frederic & Prat, Andrea, 2003. "Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 113-137, Spring.
    8. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
    9. Palomino, F.A., 1997. "Relative Performance Equilibrium in Financial Markets," Discussion Paper 1997-99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharftstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1992. "Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1461-1484, September.
    11. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    12. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. "Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
    13. Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 1998. "Fee Speech: Adverse Selection and the Regulation of Mutual Funds," NBER Working Papers 6644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Palomino, F.A. & Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 1999. "Should smart investors buy funds with high returns in the past," Other publications TiSEM 6fa9174d-5b50-47fe-9f84-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Palomino, F.A. & Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 1999. "Should smart investors buy funds with high returns in the past," Discussion Paper 1999-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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