The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
This paper examines the conception of individuals as being of certain types in Harsanyi'stransformation of games of incomplete information into games of complete information. Itargues that while the conception of the individual in games of complete information offerspotential advances over the problematic neoclassical conception of the individual, Harsanyi'smore realistic incomplete information games framework essentially re-introduces the difficultiesfrom the neoclassical conception. A further argument of the paper is that flxed point equilibriumexistence proof theorems and individual existence proofs function in an analogous manner, andcan consequently been seen as both dependent upon one another. Thus the inadequacy ofHarsanyi's conception of individuals raises questions about Nash equilibrium approaches toequilibria in games.
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- John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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- John Davis & Matthias Klaes, 2003. "Reflexivity: curse or cure?," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 329-352.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-741, September.
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