Raising the take-up of social assistance benefits through a simple mailing: evidence from a French field experiment
This paper is related to the phenomenon puzzling unduly low take-up rate for social assistance benefits in France. In order to investigate this phenomenon, we conduct an experimental evaluation in the form of a randomized control trial involving the influences of informational availability and complexity. We examine the impact of a change in the information set which is sent to these households just after they claim the benefit, seeking a behavioral response to this particular ‘nudge’. Our findings suggest that a costless action on the part of program administrators is able to substantially increase take-up for certain types of beneficiaries. In order to be effective, these actions should target households according to their individual attributes.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2017|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Université Paris-Est Marne La Vallée, 5 bd Descartes, 77454 Champs sur Marne|
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