El anidamiento institucional y su dinámica histórica en comunidades rurales complejas. Dos estudios de caso (Navarra, siglos XIV-XX)
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the analysis of nested governance of common-pool resources from a long-term perspective. Our main research questions are: How was nesting articulated in pre-industrial societies? Which were their advantages and risks? Which are the factors that explain their origin and dynamics? To answer them, we analyse two historical case studies of nested regimens. In particular, the Valley of Roncal and the Sierra de Lokiz, both of them situated in Navarre, arranged across several levels the management and use of grazing pastures and forests by the 14th century.
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