El anidamiento institucional y su dinámica histórica en comunidades rurales complejas. Dos estudios de caso (Navarra, siglos XIV-XX)
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Agrawal, Arun & Gibson, Clark C., 1999. "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 629-649, April.
- Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "'Whatever is, is right'? Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe -super-1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 60(4), pages 649-684, November.
- Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
- Stefano Fenoaltea, 1988. "Transaction Costs, Whig History, and the Common Fields," Politics & Society, , vol. 16(2-3), pages 171-240, June.
- Tine De Moor, 2009. "Avoiding tragedies: a Flemish common and its commoners under the pressure of social and economic change during the eighteenth century -super-1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Gibson, Clark C. & Ostrom, Elinor & Ahn, T. K., 2000. "The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 217-239, February.
- Ackerman, John, 2004. "Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond "Exit" and "Voice"," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 447-463, March.
- Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.
- Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 185-205, Fall.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
More about this item
Keywordscollective action; nesting principle; commons; regulations; conflicts;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:seh:wpaper:1307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antonio Linares). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sehiaea.html .