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Relationship–Specific Capital in Public Decision-Making: Evidence from Judges and Lawyers

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Abstract

Public decision makers often repeatedly interact with the same specialized agents. These interactions may generate relationship–specific capital which can affect information transmission and, ultimately, outcomes. We study this mechanism in appellate adjudication, using all judgments issued by the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation from 2017 to 2022. We reconstruct the interaction history between each lawyer and judge panel and find that a one-standard-deviation increase in cumulative number of matches is associated with a 5–7% higher probability of victory relative to the mean. Survey evidence, fielded of lawyers admitted to practice before the Court, points to panel–specific learning as the most plausible mechanism, with ambiguous normative implications for equal access to public decision makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Immordino & Tommaso Oliviero & Matteo Vasca, 2026. "Relationship–Specific Capital in Public Decision-Making: Evidence from Judges and Lawyers," CSEF Working Papers 790, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:790
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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