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Design and Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact: The Perspective of New Member States

  • Fabrizio Coricelli

Current developments in the design and management of fiscal rules in the European Union may have negative implications for New Member States. Loosening of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and a growing degree of arbitrariness in its implementation reduce incentives for fiscal adjustment in New Member States, adjustment that would be crucial during the transition to the Eurozone. High budget deficits may prove a serious obstacle in the process of catching up of New Member States to the income levels of EU-15 countries.

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Paper provided by CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research in its series CASE Network Studies and Analyses with number 0304.

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Length: 20 Pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0304
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  1. Jérôme Creel, 2003. "Ranking Fiscal Policy Rules: the Golden Rule of Public Finance vs. the Stability and Growth Pact," Sciences Po publications 2003-04, Sciences Po.
  2. Fabrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Exchange rate policy during transition to the European Monetary Union: The option of euroization," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 10(2), pages 405-417, July.
  3. Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Martin Larch & Matteo Salto, 2005. "Fiscal rules, inertia and discretionary fiscal policy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(10), pages 1135-1146.
  6. Riccardo Fiorito, 1997. "Stylized Facts of Government Finance in the G-7," IMF Working Papers 97/142, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Marco Buti & Paul van den Noord, 2003. "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections: The Experience of the Early Years of EMU," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 351, OECD Publishing.
  8. Enrique G. Mendoza & P. Marcelo Oviedo, 2006. "Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Uncertainty in Emerging Markets: The Tale of the Tormented Insurer," 2006 Meeting Papers 377, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Alejandro Izquierdo & Ernesto Talvi & Guillermo A. Calvo, 2002. "Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," Research Department Publications 4299, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
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