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Dynamic Games and Growth Cycles in Unionised Economies

  • Enrico Marchetti

In this paper we integrate the dynamic models formulated by the microeconomic theory of trade unions and the differential games approach. We demonstrate that the results of the dynamic monopoly union model, elaborated by Kidd and Oswald (1987) and Jones and McKenna (1994), can be obtained as solutions of a Stackelberg differential game between firms and unions under particular assumptions on union’s membership dynamic. We also develop a Nash differential game whose solutions imply a cycle in wage share of product and employment rate which resembles Goodwin’s (1967) cyclical growth path. This result is obtained by use of the Hopf theorem on local bifurcations, under particular hypotheses on the membership dynamics.

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Paper provided by University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 32.

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Length: 39
Date of creation: Oct 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp32
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  1. repec:rie:review:v:2:y:1997:i:2:n:1 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Jones, Stephen R. G., 1987. "Union membership and employment dynamics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 197-200.
  3. Jones, Stephen R G & McKenna, C J, 1994. "A Dynamic Model of Union Membership and Employment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(242), pages 179-89, May.
  4. Marchetti Enrico, 1998. "Cooperative and Noncooperative Differential Games between Firms and Trade Unions," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 223-242.
  5. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521484619 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Paz Espinosa, Maria & Rhee, Changyong, 1989. "Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 565-88, August.
  7. Chiarini Bruno, 1997. "A Dynamic Union Model with Pensioners Membership," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 147-162.
  8. Gottfries, Nils & Horn, Henrik, 1987. "Wage Formation and the Persistence of Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388), pages 877-84, December.
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