Consumo privado, inversión pública e impuestos en una solución no cooperativa
Este trabajo analiza el equilibrio no cooperativo de Nah sobre un juego diferencial entre el gobierno y el sector privado. La tecnología tiene una influencia directa sobre el comportamiento de las trayectorias de capital público y privado en el equilibrio, por ello, se analiza una tecnología no lineal y una lineal. Las características que presenta el equilibrio con la tecnología lineal permiten caracterizarle como un subjuego perfecto, lo que permite la construcción de estrategias de amenaza que mejoran los objetivos de los sectores. This paper examines the Nash equilibria solution for a differential game between the government and the private sector. The effect that technology has on the strategies of both players is studied to consider a non linear and linear production function. The equilibria when the technology is linear has the propety to be a subgame perfect. It allows us to build trigger strategies.
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Volume (Year): 8 (1997)
Issue (Month): (Diciembre)
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- Buffie, Edward F., 1995. "Public investment, private investment, and inflation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1223-1247. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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