Who pays for job training?
This paper addresses a puzzle in the UK labour market. Why is not there enough investment in job training when there is a high skill premium? We model this as a coordination game between firms and workers. Using a social planning model as a baseline, the paper demonstrates that while it is socially beneficial to invest in job training, the private sector may fail to internalize these benefits in a wide range of economies. The chance of this coordination failure is greater in economies with a higher inequality in the skill distribution and a higher rate of time preference.Creation-Date: 2008-11
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL|
Phone: 01334 462420
Fax: 01334 462444
Web page: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/cdma
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2004.
"Does Poaching Distort Training?,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1143-1162.
- Haskel, Jonathan & Martin, Christopher, 2001. "Technology, Wages, and Skill Shortages: Evidence from UK Micro Data," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 642-58, October.
- Lars Peter Hansen & James J. Heckman, 1996. "The Empirical Foundations of Calibration," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 87-104, Winter.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:san:cdmacp:0802. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (the School of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.