Who pays for job training?
An optimal education subsidy formula is derived using an overlapping generations model with parental altruism. The model predicts that public education subsidy is greater in economies with lesser parental altruism because a benevolent government has to compensate for the shortfall in private education spending of less altruistic parents with a finite life. On the other hand, growth is higher in economies with greater parental altruism. Cross-country regressions using the World Values Survey for altruism lend support to our model predictions. The model provides insights about the reasons for higher education subsidy in richer countries.
|Date of creation:||16 Feb 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, England|
Phone: +44 (0)191 334 5200
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Web page: http://www.dur.ac.uk/business
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Nickell, Stephen & Bell, Brian, 1995. "The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled and Unemployment across the OECD," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 40-62, Spring.
- Haskel, Jonathan & Martin, Christopher, 2001. "Technology, Wages, and Skill Shortages: Evidence from UK Micro Data," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(4), pages 642-658, October.
- Stevens, Margaret, 1994. "A Theoretical Model of On-the-Job Training with Imperfect Competition," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 537-562, October.
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