Competition Policy in South Africa: From 1994 to Now

This paper examines the evolution of South African competition policy since the Competition Act of 1998, focusing on merger control and anti-cartel enforcement. Using a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework, the analysis evaluates whether enforcement trends are driven by research and policy experience or by shifting policy preferences. The findings reveal two divergent paths: merger control has become significantly more interventionist with broader theories of harm, largely driven by changing policy preferences rather than empirical evidence; meanwhile, anti-cartel enforcement expanded rapidly before stabilising, with its growth primarily supported by learning effects and international practices, though recent novel interpretations of collusion also reflect preference shifts. The paper identifies tensions between these approaches—one evolving based on economic literature and international precedent, the other shaped by policymaker preferences. It concludes that competition policy dominated by preferences rather than systematic, evidence-based evolution may undermine effective competition enforcement, even when pursuing broader objectives beyond economic efficiency.