Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties
This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2006|
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- Mavrotas, George & Villanger, Espen, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2006/02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993.
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- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "Rigging The Lobbying Process: An Application Of The All- Pay Auction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1002, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 447-453, June.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-651, June.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ellingsen, T., 1990. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Papers 05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 265-282, 05.
- Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Effort and Performance in Public-Policy Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 634, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jac C. Heckelman & Stephen Knack, 2008. "Foreign Aid and Market-Liberalizing Reform," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 524-548, 08.
- Heckelman, Jac & Knack, Stephen, 2005. "Foreign aid and market-liberalizing reform," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3557, The World Bank.
- McGillivray, Mark & Feeny, Simon & Hermes, Niels & Lensink, Robert, 2005. "It Works; It Doesn't; It Can, But That Depends?: 50 Years of Controversy over the Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid," WIDER Working Paper Series 054, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, 05.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2005. "Contests, NGOs and Decentralizing Aid," IZA Discussion Papers 1711, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Epstein, Gil S., 2000. "Personal productivity and the likelihood of electoral success of political candidates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 95-111, March.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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