Market Analysis in the Presence of Indirect Constraints and Captive Sales
This paper analyzes merchant markets in the presence of vertically-integrated firms. We discuss when vertical integration tends to increase the elasticity of (derived) demand in the merchant market because of indirect contraints arising from the retail market. We also discuss the relevance of different measures of market power such as market shares in the wholesale or retail market. We provide insights into the likely effect of an upstream merger under vertical integration, depending on, for instance, whether the integrated firm currently sells into the merchant market or whether this can be expected after the merger.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma|
Web page: http://www.ceistorvergata.it
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|Order Information:|| Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma|
Web: http://www.ceistorvergata.it Email:
References listed on IDEAS
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- Eric Avenel & Corinne Barlet, 2000.
"Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 211-230, 06.
- Eric Avenel & Corinne Barlet, 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 211-230, 06.
- Avenel, E. & Barlet, C., 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice and Entry on the Intermediate Market," Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications 2000.18, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Alexander Schrader & Stephen Martin, 1998. "Vertical Market Participation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(3), pages 321-331, June.
- Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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