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Votes for Sale

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  • Rohit Ticku

Abstract

This paper examines the financial gains derived from holding public office for independentlegislators in India. Given that party-affiliated legislators are legally prohibited from engagingin cross-voting or defection, I hypothesize that independent legislators can secure rents whentheir support becomes pivotal for government formation. Utilizing candidate asset disclosuresfrom Indian state elections spanning 2003 to 2012, I demonstrate that independent legislatorsamass wealth at a faster pace than their party-affiliated counterparts in states where thelargest party or coalition falls short of a majority. The point estimates suggest that, for eachadditional seat that the largest party or coalition falls short of a majority, an independentlegislator experiences an approximate 2% annual increase in their assets relative to a partyaffiliated legislator. The disproportionate gains are particularly prominent in movable assets,implying a potential quid-pro-quo involving cash payments.

Suggested Citation

  • Rohit Ticku, 2023. "Votes for Sale," RSCAS Working Papers 2023/55, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2023/55
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    2. Eggers, Andrew C. & Hainmueller, Jens, 2009. "MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 513-533, November.
    3. Raymond Fisman & Florian Schulz & Vikrant Vig, 2014. "The Private Returns to Public Office," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(4), pages 806-862.
    4. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2023. "Rent-Seeking and Criminal Politicians: Evidence from Mining Booms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 20-39, January.
    5. A. Colin Cameron & Douglas L. Miller, 2015. "A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(2), pages 317-372.
    6. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    7. Kapoor, Sacha & Magesan, Arvind, 2018. "Independent Candidates and Political Representation in India," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 678-697, August.
    8. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Independent politicians; Government formation; Political rents; Asset growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N35 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Asia including Middle East
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

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