Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness
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- Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2020. "Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness," RSCAS Working Papers 2020/36, European University Institute.
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More about this item
Keywords
Public Procurement; Regulation; Competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2020-11-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2020-11-09 (Regulation)
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