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Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness

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  • Bedri Kamil Onur Tas

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the impact of public procurement regulation quality on competition and cost-effectiveness. I employ the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement quality scores. Using extensive data about public procurement in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and Macedonia, the paper exhibits positive effects of improved regulation quality. Better quality scores are associated with higher levels of competition and cost-effectiveness. Improved regulation quality significantly increases number of bidders and the probability that procurement price is lower than estimated cost

Suggested Citation

  • Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2019. "Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness," RSCAS Working Papers 2019/22, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2019/22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lewbel, Arthur, 2018. "Identification and estimation using heteroscedasticity without instruments: The binary endogenous regressor case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 10-12.
    2. Ishii, Rieko, 2009. "Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 137-144, March.
    3. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steven Tadelis, 2014. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1288-1319, April.
    4. Timothy G. Conley & Francesco Decarolis, 2016. "Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 1-38, May.
    5. repec:taf:jnlbes:v:30:y:2012:i:1:p:67-80 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Baldi, Simona & Bottasso, Anna & Conti, Maurizio & Piccardo, Chiara, 2016. "To bid or not to bid: That is the question: Public procurement, project complexity and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 89-106.
    7. J. Edgardo Campos & Sanjay Pradhan, 2007. "The Many Faces of Corruption : Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6848, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2020. "Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness," RSCAS Working Papers 2020/36, European University Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Procurement; Regulation; Competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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