George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, Joseph E. Stiglitz: Markets with Asymmetric Information
Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz's analyses form the core of modern information economics. Their work transformed the way economists think about the functioning of markets. The analytical methods they suggested have been applied to explain many social and economic institutions, especially different types of contracts. Other researchers have used and extended their original models to analyze organizations and institutions, as well as macroeconomic issues, such as monetary and employment policy.
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| Length: | 20 pages |
| Date of creation: | 10 Oct 2001 |
| Date of revision: | |
| Handle: | RePEc:ris:nobelp:2001_002 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org
|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Kelly Bedard, .
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- Kelly Bedard, 2001. "Human Capital versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Dropouts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 749-775, August.
- Kelly Bedard, . "Human Capital Versus Signaling Models: University Access and High School Drop-outs," Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers 19, McMaster University.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
- Dahlby, B. G., 1983. "Adverse selection and statistical discrimination : An analysis of Canadian automobile insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, February.
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Newman, Andrew F, 1998. "Information, the Dual Economy, and Development," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 631-53, October.
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