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George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, Joseph E. Stiglitz: Markets with Asymmetric Information

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  • Committee, Nobel Prize

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Abstract

Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz's analyses form the core of modern information economics. Their work transformed the way economists think about the functioning of markets. The analytical methods they suggested have been applied to explain many social and economic institutions, especially different types of contracts. Other researchers have used and extended their original models to analyze organizations and institutions, as well as macroeconomic issues, such as monetary and employment policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Committee, Nobel Prize, 2001. "George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, Joseph E. Stiglitz: Markets with Asymmetric Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2001-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2001_002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
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    11. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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