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Sovereign Borrowing for Dubious Reforms: A model with applications on the EMU

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  • Ludwig , Maximilian

    () (Hamburg University)

Abstract

This paper presents a model where governments need loans to finance reforms and may misuse these funds for consumption without immediately exposing this to its lenders. Such a misuse is ultimately followed by a sovereign default, therefore lenders will try to discipline governments in favor of true reforms. This puts a government and its lenders in a sequential game, which has two remarkable properties: First, discipling a government in favor of reforms may work, albeit far from perfect. Second, the game implies jumps in the interest rate as observed in the EMU debt crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Ludwig , Maximilian, 2013. "Sovereign Borrowing for Dubious Reforms: A model with applications on the EMU," Working Papers 29/2013, Universidade Portucalense, Centro de Investigação em Gestão e Economia (CIGE).
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:cigewp:2013_029
    as

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    File URL: http://siupt.uportu.pt/content/files/dcee/Investigacao/WP_29_2013.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Romain Duval & Jørgen Elmeskov, 2005. "The Effects of EMU on Structural Reforms in Labour and Product Markets," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 438, OECD Publishing.
    2. Gómez-Puig, Marta, 2008. "Monetary integration and the cost of borrowing," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 455-479, April.
    3. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1995. "The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 45-64, February.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Vincenzo Galasso, 2011. "The Euro and Structural Reforms," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 2(1).
    5. Roel Beetsma & Massimo Giuliodori, 2010. "The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 603-641, September.
    6. Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2007. "Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195534, March.
    7. Alois Geyer & Stephan Kossmeier & Stefan Pichler, 2004. "Measuring Systematic Risk in EMU Government Yield Spreads," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 8(2), pages 171-197.
    8. Faruk Balli, 2009. "Spillover effects on government bond yields in euro zone. Does full financial integration exist in European government bond markets?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 33(4), pages 331-363, October.
    9. Alois Geyer & Stephan Kossmeier & Stefan Pichler, 2004. "Measuring Systematic Risk in EMU Government Yield Spreads," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 171-197.
    10. Gérard Roland, 2002. "The Political Economy of Transition," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 29-50, Winter.
    11. Cole, Harold L & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1998. "Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, February.
    12. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1234-1247, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reforms; Sovereign default; Sequential Game; Bail-Out;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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