Emergence of Rating Agencies: Implications for Establishing a Regional Rating Agency in Asia
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Eloïc Peyrache & Lucía Quesada, 2009. "The ownership of ratings," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 234-257.
More about this item
Keywordscredit rating agencies; moral hazard; incomplete contracting;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-IFN-2010-08-21 (International Finance)
- NEP-REG-2010-08-21 (Regulation)
- NEP-SEA-2010-08-21 (South East Asia)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0241. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ADB Institute) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/adbinjp.html .